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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
v. 
THOMAS WESTLAND CALLAHAN, Case No. 20050753-CA 
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. 
Not Incarcerated 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this 
misdemeanor appeal from a court of record. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does prosecutorial misconduct require a new trial? 
This Court reviews claims of prosecutorial misconduct under an abuse of 
discretion standard, and will reverse of the prosecutor's conduct or remarks called the 
jury's attention to improper matters in circumstances indicating a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable result absent the misconduct. See, State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35, TJ 22, 999 
P.2d 7. 
This issue was preserved by trial counsel's objections (R. 124 at 96, 108). 
2. Was the evidence legally insufficient to sustain the trespass conviction? 
To challenge the jury's trespass conviction, Mr. Callahan must marshal all 
evidence sustaining that verdict, and state the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, and then demonstrate why, as a matter of law, the evidence was legally 
insufficient. See, e ^ , State v. Pritchett 2003 UT 24, ^  22, 69 P.3d 1278. 
This issue was not preserved by trial counsel. Callahan relies on the doctrines of 
ineffective assistance, plain error and exceptional circumstances in seeking full relief on 
appeal. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Pertinent constitutional provisions and statutes are in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Mr. Callahan with three counts of class A misdemeanor assault 
on a peace officer and one count of class C misdemeanor trespass (R. 1-3). 
A jury convicted Callahan of two counts of assault on a peace officer (for assaults 
on Officers Wihongi and Peterson) and one count of trespass (for remaining on property 
with a reckless state of mind regarding whether his presence would cause fear for the 
safety of another), and acquitted him of the remaining count of assault on a peace officer 
(for Officer Findlay) (R. 1-3, 70). 
Judge Reese sentenced Callahan to two years in jail, suspended 277 days, gave 
Callahan credit for time served, and put Callahan on one year of good behavior probation 
to the court (R. 105-07; R. 125 at 6). 
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Appointed counsel filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 110). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 26, 2002, at about 5:20 p.m., Mr. Callahan, age 60, was sitting on a 
bench in front of the Liberty Senior Citizens Center peacefully opening cans of food with 
the can opener on his Leatherman tool (R. 124 at 66, 51-52, 61). He was homeless and 
had eaten meals at the center in the months prior to this, and had been warned on 
occasions that his boisterous behavior was inappropriate and would not be tolerated (R. 
124 at 21-22), but there is no evidence that there was anyone around him when he was 
sitting there trying to eat on August 26, 2002, some two hours after closing time (R. 124 
at 20). 
Police officers Peterson and Wihongi responded to the scene to investigate a 
trespass complaint at the center (R. 124 at 48-51, 68). 
Callahan was peaceful and was not threatening anyone with his Leatherman, but 
Peterson walked up to Callahan and forcefully took the Leatherman out of Callahan's 
hand and put it down out of Callahan's reach (R. 124 at 52, 62). Peterson could not recall 
if he and Wihongi identified themselves as police, and Callahan was angry and wanted to 
know why they were bothering him (R. 124 at 52-53). 
The officers, who were in uniform, told Callahan they were there to investigate his 
presence there, and he calmed down (R. 124 at 51-53, 61). 
While Officer Peterson was on the phone trying 1o get information from the 
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complainant, Peterson noticed that Officer Wihongi had drawn his baton, and that 
Callahan was standing in a fighting stance (R. 124 at 53-54, 63). Peterson pulled his 
baton, but before Peterson could hit Callahan on the leg as he intended, Wihongi pushed 
Callahan to the ground (R. 124 at 54, 63). The officers subdued Callahan, who was 
cursing and agitated, and cuffed him behind his back (R. 124 at 54, 56, 63-65, 67). 
Peterson, the only witness who testified about these events, testified that Callahan 
threatened Wihongi with the Leatherman (R. 124 at 68). He then explained that Wihongi 
told Peterson that Callahan had grabbed the Leatherman and had refused to put it down, 
telling Wihongi that Wihongi would have to shoot him to get him to drop it (R. 124 at 
71). Peterson's report said that Callahan grabbed the Leatherman, and does not detail any 
conversation or any threat towards Wihongi by Callahan with the Leatherman (R. 124 at 
70). 
Peterson alleged that the officers had Callahan cuffed in back and were taking him 
by his arms to their car, when Callahan turned toward Peterson, who lost balance and fell 
to the ground with Callahan on top of him (R. 124 at 56, 64-65, 67). Callahan's glasses 
were broken and his nose was cut (R. 124 at 57, 65). Peterson pushed Callahan off, and 
as the officers subdued Callahan and shackled his legs, Callahan was spitting and trying 
to kick Peterson and trying to bite Wihongi on the leg (R. 124 at 56-57). Peterson 
testified that Callahan also kicked at a third officer Finlay, and also fought with jail 
officers when they brought him to the jail (R. 124 at 59-60). 
4 
An employee from the center gave Callahan a letter on August 28, 2002, telling 
him he was unwelcome at the center, and also told him this personally on that date, but 
could not recall that she ever told him this before that date (R. 124 at 24-25, 29, 37, 42, 
46). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The prosecutor's discussion of facts not in evidence in closing argument requires a 
new trial. Contrary to his arguments (R. 124 at 96), there was no evidence that Callahan 
pointed the Leatherman at the officers and threatened Wihongi with it. Contrary to his 
arguments (R. 124 at 108), there is no evidence that an officer approached Callahan and 
asked to speak to him, and Callahan spit at him, kicked him and waived a can opener in 
his face (R. 124 at 108). 
The evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the trespass charge, which was 
charged and defined by jury instructions as Callahan's remaining on property with a 
reckless state of mind regarding whether his presence would cause fear for the safety of 
another. There was no evidence to support this theory on the facts of this case, which 
prove that Callahan was sitting on a bench outside the center peacefully opening his 
canned food when the police approached him. 
While trial counsel did not seek a directed verdict or preserve the issue, given the 
total lack of evidence to sustain this charge, this Court should reverse that conviction and 
order that charge dismissed. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. RELEVANT LAW 
Utah law has long recognized that a criminal trial is supposed to be a search for the 
truth, rather than a mere contest between the defense and prosecution.1 In State v. 
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, the court explained the special role of the 
prosecutor, which does not call for overreaching, but which requires constant vigilance 
for fairness. The court stated, 
Once again we observe that prosecutors have duties that rise above those of 
privately employed attorneys f,[P]rosecutors have a duty to eschew all 
improper tactics." ... 
"[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is 
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the 
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he 
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to bring about a just one." 
Id. at 961 (citations omitted). 
If a prosecutor's comments taint the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, the 
'See, e.g.. State v. Hav. 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993); State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 
662 (Utah 1985); State v. JarrelL 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980). 
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arguments violate a defendant's right to due process of law. See, e.g., Darden v. 
Wainwright 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986).2 Claims of prosecutorial misconduct require a 
fact-specific inquiry which is guided by the defendant's constitutional rights to a fair 
trial.3 
In Utah, the general test for prosecutorial misconduct is set forth in State v. Troy, 
688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), as follows: 
"The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so 
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case is, did the remarks call 
to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by those remarks." 
Id. at 486 (citation omitted). Arguing matters unsupported by evidence violates Troy. Id. 
The Troy Court persuasively explained the prejudice analysis further, 
Step two is more difficult and involves a consideration of the 
2Article I §§ 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution provide due process of law and the 
right to a fair trial, as does Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6. Article I § 7, the due process 
provision, has been interpreted as requiring exclusion of unreliable evidence which is 
likely to be unduly impressive to jurors, see State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), 
and as requiring an inquiry into the merits of the case to be adjudicated, see 
generally Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). Article I § 12 provides 
the general procedural and substantive rights of criminal defendants to insure the 
fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings. See, generally. State v. Anderson, 612 
P.2d 778 (Utah 1980). When a prosecutor's arguments draw the jurors' attention away 
from the merits of the case, and call into question the reliability and fairness of the 
proceedings and verdict or sentence, these provisions are implicated 
3See United States v. Soconv-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 240 (1940)("Of 
course, appeals to passion and prejudice may so poison the minds of the jurors even in a 
strong case that an accused may be deprived of a fair trial.... [E]ach case necessarily turns 
on its own facts."). 
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circumstances of the case as a whole. In making such a consideration, it is 
appropriate to look at the evidence of defendant's guilt. 
"If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or 
remark will not be presumed prejudicial." Likewise, in a case with less 
compelling proof, this Court will more closely scrutinize the conduct. If the 
conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or 
evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater 
likelihood that they will be improperly influenced through remarks of 
counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be searching for guidance in 
weighing and interpreting the evidence. They may be especially susceptible 
to influence, and a small degree of influence may be sufficient to affect the 
verdict. Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid, as far as possible, any 
reference to those matters the jury is not justified in considering. 
Id. at 486-87 (citation omitted). 
It is the State's burden to show that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. State v. Tarafa. 720 P.2d 1368, 1373 and n.21 (Utah 1986). All 
reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. Eaton. 569 P.2d 
1114, 1116 (Utah 1977).4 
B. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS 
The prosecutor's discussion of facts not in evidence in closing argument requires a 
new trial. 
Contrary to his arguments (R. 124 at 96), there was no evidence that Callahan 
pointed the Leatherman at the officers and threatened Wihongi with it. 
Contrary to his arguments (R. 124 at 108), there is no evidence that an officer 
4More recent opinions from the Utah Supreme Court have stated differing 
standards. See, e^g., State v. Hav, 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993)(a defendant must show that 
the results would likely have been more favorable in the absence of the misconduct). 
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approached Callahan and asked to speak to him, and Callahan spit at him, kicked him and 
waived a can opener in his face (R. 124 at 108). 
When trial counsel objected to the prosecutor's misstatements of the evidence, the 
trial court did nothing to reign in the prosecutor, but instructed the jury that the arguments 
of counsel were not evidence and that the jurors were free to rely on their own memories, 
and could accept or disregard what the prosecutor said (R. 124 at 96-97, 108). 
Given that the prosecutor's arguments were unsupported by the evidence, the trial 
court erred in telling the jurors that they could rely on what the prosecutor said. The trial 
court should have reprimanded the prosecutor for his misconduct, and instructed the 
jurors to disregard his misstatements. See, e.g., Troy, supra. 
Particularly given the court's erroneous instruction that the jurors could rely on the 
prosecutor's assertions, the State cannot meet its burden to prove the misstatements 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, there is a reasonable probability of acquittal 
on the record of this case. Had the jurors not been misinformed regarding the evidence 
and instructed on their supposed entitlement to rely on that misinformation, they may well 
have sided with Mr. Callahan, a sixty year old homeless man who was peacefully trying 
to open his canned food (R. 124 at 21-22, 66, 51-52, 61), and who was accosted by the 
officers, who forcefully took his Leatherman without explaining why first (R. 124 at 51-
53, 61-62), who threatened him with their batons and pushed him to the ground (R. 124 at 
53-54, 63), who cuffed him, dragged him, fell with him to the ground, and pushed him 
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and shackled his legs, resulting in his broken glasses and cut nose (R. 124 at 56, 64-65, 
67)). See Statement of Facts, supra. 
Under Troy, a new trial is in order. See id. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE TRESPASS CONVICTION. 
As this case was charged (R. 1-3), and as the jury was instructed (R. 124 at 90), to 
sustain the trespass conviction, the State was required to prove that Callahan entered or 
remained unlawfully on the property and was reckless regarding whether his presence 
would cause fear to the safety of another. Accord, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(a)(iii)(2) 
("A person is guilty of criminal trespass if,.. .(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on 
property and: (iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of 
another[.]"). 
There is no evidence whatsoever to marshal in support of the element that 
Callahan was reckless as to whether his presence would cause fear to the safety of another 
on August 26, 2002, when he was sitting peacefully on a bench outside the Liberty Senior 
Center, opening his cans of food (R. 124 at 66, 51-52, 61). See Statement of Facts, supra. 
While he had been warned on prior occasions that his boisterous conduct on those 
occasions would not be tolerated at the center (R. 124 at 21-22), and while he was 
informed two days after the incident with the police that he was no longer welcome at the 
center (R. 124 at 24-25, 29, 37, 42, 46), there is no evidence that he should have known 
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that his presence on the bench outside the center as he was trying to eat his dinner on 
August 26th would cause anyone to fear for their safety. 
The trespass charge was premised on the misunderstanding that Callahan had been 
told by a Liberty Center employee prior to August 26, 2002, that he could not be at the 
center after hours (R. 2). The testimony presented at trial did not support this theory, 
because the woman who communicated that message to Callahan did so in writing on 
August 28, 2002, and could not testify that she did so verbally at any time prior thereto 
(R. 124 at 24-25, 29, 37, 42, 46). 
Even if Callahan had been told by a Liberty Center employee that he was not 
welcome there after hours, this would not have given him any reason or obligation to 
know that his presence would frighten someone for their safety. 
Because the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain that charge, this Court 
should reverse the trespass conviction. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(a)(iii)(2), supra. 
Trial counsel argued insufficiency of the evidence to the jury (R. 124 at 102-03), 
but did not move for a directed verdict or ask the trial court to arrest judgment or 
otherwise address the insufficiency of the evidence. 
To the degree that trial counsel did not preserve the issue discussed above, this 
Court should nonetheless address and correct the error under the exceptional 
circumstances, plain error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. 
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving '"rare 
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procedural anomalies/" as a "'safety device"5 to avoid manifest injustice. State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, If 23, 94 P.3d 186. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness 
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in 
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and 
Article I § 12, Callahan must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below 
objectively reasonable standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient 
performance was prejudicial. See e^ g. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert. 
denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all 
issues in the lower court. See, e^g,, State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at 110, 67 P3d 
1005. 
The law in this State clearly places the burden on criminal trial lawyers to raise 
claims of insufficient evidence in the trial courts. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 
P.3d 346. 
Failing to ask the trial court for relief from that charge and conviction was 
objectively deficient and prejudicial performance; there was and could have been no valid 
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strategic reason for trial counsel to abstain from asking the trial court for the same thing 
she appropriately sought from the jury - acquittal on the trespass count, which was not 
sustained by the evidence. Compare, e.g.. State v. Moritzky. 771 P.2d 688, 691-93 (Utah 
App. 1989) (trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in obtaining a jury instruction on 
defense of habitation which lacked helpful presumption provided in amended defense of 
habitation statute, resulting the denial of a fair trial and the need for a new trial). 
Because there is no evidence to sustain this criminal conviction, and it would be 
manifestly unjust to leave the conviction on Mr. Callahan's record, this Court should 
correct the error under the exceptional circumstances doctrine discussed above. 
See Nelson-Waggoner, supra (Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in 
cases involving "'rare procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest 
injustice). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Callahan's convictions and remand this matter to 
the trial court for a new trial on the two remaining charges of assault on a police officer. 
Respectfully submitted this NovemlAspj^^ \ 
Attorney for Mr. Callahan 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on November 20, 2005,1 mailed, first class postage pre-paid, 
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two true and correct copies of the foregoing to: Deputy District Attorney John D. 
Shuman, 185 South State, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Elizab^ 
Attorn&J for" Callahan 
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ADDENDUM 
TRIAL COURT RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS 
TO PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Page 9 
for your participation today. 
At the beginning of our trial this morning I 
said that we would be discussing some different issues. 
I suggested that the defendant, Mr. Callahan was 
something of a bully, someone who has tantrums when he 
doesn't get his way, somebody who had developed a 
pattern of conduct at the Liberty Senior Center over a 
course of months and was finally asked to leave, it had 
just become intolerable. I believe that the testimony of 
Nancy Freeman has shown that. In addition, Officer 
Peterson testified that when officers were called 
because Mr. Callahan had trespassed on the property, he 
became belligerent. He pointed a leatherman tool at the 
officers. Most of us when we're approached by an 
officer, whether for a traffic ticket or something, we 
generally are cooperative. That was not the testimony 
here. The testimony was that Mr. Callahan became 
belligerent, threatened Officer Wihongi with this 
leatherman tool. And after--
MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I don't believe 
that that was actually the testimony. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel Members of 
the Jury, I'll just-- that happens from time to time, 
one of the attorneys will feel that the other is 
incorrectly stating the facts, and my practice is to 
Page 97 
1 just remind you that these attorneys are not advocates--
2 I mean they're not witnesses, excuse me. They are 
3 advocates, not witnesses. What they say is not 
4 evidence. So if you disagree with anything either of 
5 them say, that's fine. Rely upon your own recollection 
6 of what the witnesses said, not necessarily on what you 
7 hear the attorneys say when they summarize it. Go 
8 ahead, Counsel. 
9 MR. SHUMAN: So what is uncontroverted is 
10 that Officer Peterson's testimony that it took three 
11 officers to control and contain the situation, to find 
12 out what was going on here. That when they approached 
13 Mr. Callahan he did have something in his hand, it turns 
14 out to be a leatherman tool, but certainly an officer 
15 can't just stand there and let somebody wave anything 
16 around in their hand. That wouldn't be common sense. The 
17 testimony was that the situation escalated, that Mr. 
18 Callahan wouldn't calm down, and he was disrespectful to 
19 the officers. And isn't that the bottom issue here? He 
20 was disrespectful to the people at the Liberty Senior 
21 Center and he was disrespectful to the officers when 
22 they approached him. 
23 Now, Judge Reese has just spent quite some 
24 time reading to you these jury instructions and I 
25 encourage you to pay very close attention to these 
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1 last rebuttal if you have any. 
2 MR. SHUMAN: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. 
3 Well, this defense attorney has just indicated that Mr. 
4 Callahan is a confrontational person and what we heard 
5 is uncontroverted testimony today about his 
6 confrontational nature. He confronted and abused and 
7 threatened people at the old folks home, and he 
8 confronted and threatened the officers when they were 
9 called to respond there. 
10 Let's not split hairs too finely. Let's 
11 decide what message we want to send: That it's okay 
12 when an officer says, "Can I speak to you for a minute," 
13 that it's okay to spit at him, and kick him, and wave 
14 your can opener in his face? 
15 MS. JOHNSON: Objection, Your Honor. I 
16 believe again that is not what the testimony was. 
17 MR. SHUMAN: And, again, this is what was 
18 testified to. 
19 THE COURT: Well, Members cf the Jury, you 
20 will recall the testimony from the officer about what 
21 happened and what he saw and what the other officer told 
22 him, so you can accept or disregard what the attorney 
23 said he remembers. 
24 MR. SHUMAN: And, as jurois, that's your 
25 responsibility to decide who is credible, what are we 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
§ 76-5-102. Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another 
or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another. 
§ 76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer—Penalty 
(1) Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace officer, 
and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who violates this section shall serve, in jail or another correctional facility, a 
minimum of: 
(a) 90 consecutive days for a second offense; and 
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense. 
(3) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence required under 
Subsection (2) if the court finds that the interests of justice would be best served and 
makes specific findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the record. 
§ 76-1-601. Definitions 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(I) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably 
believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control 
of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is 
capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, 
or unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control 
over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily 
injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or 
temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic 
storage or transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing 
information in a form capable of being preserved. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, 
sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of 
persons or for carrying on business therein and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at 
night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the premises or 
any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public and 
when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises 
or such portion thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
§ 76-6-206. Criminal trespass 
(1) For purposes of this section, "enter" means intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if5 under circumstances not amounting to 
burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76- 6-204 or a violation of Section 
76-10-2402 regarding commercial terrorism: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(I) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any property, 
including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of another; 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on property as to 
which notice against entering is given by: 
(I) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with apparent authority 
to act for the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders; or 
(c) he enters a condominium unit in violation of Subsection 57-8-7(7). 
(3)(a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C misdemeanor unless it was committed 
in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(b) is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the: 
(a) property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained; and 
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's use of the property. 
